

THE YEOMAN.

Published Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays

BY
S. I. M. MAJOR & COMPANY.

S. I. M. MAJOR.....Editor.

THURSDAY MAY 13.

FRANKFORT:

FOR CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
RANKIN R. REVILL,
OF OWEN.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

The members of the State Central Committee are requested to meet, on Friday next, at the office of Major & Johnson, at 10 o'clock, A. M. May 7th.

Rix Rax as a Legislator—He Attempts to Repeal the Code of Practice.

One of the most popular clauses of the new constitution, was one requiring Commissioners to be appointed to prepare a Code of Practice for the courts of this Commonwealth.

Three eminent legal gentlemen prepared the Code, with great labor and care, and it was adopted with unparalleled unanimity by the Legislature and went into effect on the 1st day of August, 1851. Three months afterwards—before time had been allowed to test its practical operation—on the 5th of November, 1851, Geo. R. McKee asked leave to bring before the House of Representatives, (of which he was a member,) a bill to repeal the Code of Practice. Afterwards, on the 7th of January, we find this entry in the House Journal (page 491):—

"Mr. McKee, from the Committee appointed to prepare and bring in the same, reported a bill to repeal the Code of Practice, which was read the first time, and the question being taken on ordering said bill to be read a second time, it was decided in the negative; and so the bill was rejected."

The proposition to repeal the Code met with so little favor, that it was lost upon the second reading of the bill—stage at which it is very unusual for a bill of any sort to be defeated. Mr. McKee flew in the face of the popular will of Kentucky, as he had before done with regard to the Common School system, and endeavored to destroy, without even a fair trial, one of the greatest legal reforms ever made in the State.

After the absolute rejection of the constitution, and the time and labor and expense incurred in the preparation of the Code, it was but just, on the part of friend and foe, to give it a thorough trial, before a proposition should be brought forward for its repeal. But it seems that Mr. McKee's bump of destructiveness was so largely developed, that he must be killing something, and, as he could not destroy Common Schools, he concluded to try his hand on the Code—but luckily for the country, with the same lack of success in this as in the other experiment. Perhaps it was his hatred of the reforms—legal and constitutional—demanded by the people, or it may be that it was his love of and veneration for the antiquated technicalities of the old British system of pleading, which caused him to desire it to be reinstated in room of the code.

It is difficult, however, to conceive of any reason which could influence a wise and prudent legislator, to make the movement at the time and in the manner in which it was made by Rix Rax.

The "Ignorance" Candidate and his friends—Elegant and highly perfumed extract of Prentice.

George D. Prentice vs. D. George Prentice.

THE ASERTION.

"His (George R. McKee) opponents find that the public printing fraud has been exposed, and have already invented another in regard to his opposition to common schools. George is emphatically a common school advocate.—Louisville Journal, April 15th 1858.

ITS DENIAL.

UNENTITLED NOTORIETY.—We observe that some of the newspapers in other States are commenting upon the introduction of a bill into our Legislature to abolish the School System in Kentucky. Mr. McKee, the mover of the measure, seems to be gaining a notoriety which we should suppose, few men would desire. To be the leader of an IGNORANCE PARTY may be agreeable enough for barbarians, or persons half civilized; but men, professing the usual intelligence of American citizens, would, we should think, shun a station to which might be attached an everlasting odium.—Louisville Journal, 1853.

"Now don't throw away the old party. It's a trusty old piece; has done well in its day. Just pick the flint, and try it again, if it has dashed and snapped miserably once. The fault is not in the piece, but in bad engineering. It's folly to pick up Know Nothingism and Black Republicanism. Their flash and snap all the time; and when they do go off, they hit the wrong object; besides kicking the holder over!"—*Lou. Dem.*

We are rejoiced to know that our venerable friend of the Democrat, has no idea of throwing away the "good old party" to pick up Know Nothingism, or Black Republicanism. The truth is, we could not afford to give him up, notwithstanding he has snatched once, but are willing to "pick he flint and try it again." Mr. HARNEY's services to the Democratic party for a long series of years have been invaluable, and now that the Kansas question, upon which we have differed from him, is about to be ended, we hope to have his cordial co-operation in the Democratic cause.

MR. STEVENSON'S SPEECH.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: If the spirits of the departed dead were cognizant of what is passing on this globe, I know the spirits of Jackson, and of Clay, and of Webster, are this night looking down upon us with joy that the constitution stands intact and that the Union is preserved. [Applause.] I come, fellow-citizens, with no claim to your partiality, except as an humble instrument of my adopted State of Kentucky, and her name I tell you that she rejoices, as she always has done, at the preservation of this glorious and hallowed Union. [Applause.] Born myself in Virginia, I claim no title for having followed out the lessons of him who spent one fourth of his life in this city, and the only reward that I have is, that in leaving my own dear Virginia, and being transplanted to Kentucky, I have not been unmindful of his teachings, or the political principles of my native State. [Applause.] Kentucky, though she long wandered from the Democratic fold, comes back, as she always has come back when the Union or constitution was in danger. You have seen the triumph of these great principles in my friend, the son of the departed statesman who nobly earned for himself the title, which will never die, of the great pacifier. [Cheers.] He has spoken, and I come as an humble follower of that great party to add my hearty amen to what he has said. [Applause.] As long as the precepts of Washington shall find a response in Kentucky, so long will Kentucky stand by Vir-

Rix Rax vs. George D. Prentice.

George (i.e. McKee), is emphatically a Common School advocate.—Louisville Journal, April 15, 1858.

Sir, the editor of the Louisville Journal, however weak an advocate he may be of education and common schools, is not, with me, good authority—George R. McKee's Speech, 9th of Feb., 1853.

Put that in your pipe and smoke it, Mr. Jour-

ginia, the mother of States, and I may say the mother of the Union. Gentlemen, I bid you good night.

The crowd then proceeded to the residence of the Hon. W. H. ENGLISH, of Indiana, who was called out, and made the following excellent speech:

MR. ENGLISH'S SPEECH.

GENTLEMEN: I thank you kindly for the compliment which you have paid me upon this occasion and I come forward cheerfully in response to your call; yet, without fear at this late hour, and after the able speeches you have heard, I shall be unable to interest and entertain you. I claim to be a man of action rather than of words, but yet I am usually able, upon proper occasions, to give a reason for the faith that is in me. I am always glad to meet my friends, and I confess not to be indifferent to their good opinion. I am gratified to meet you here to-night, because I hail you as friends, and feel that you sympathise with me, and rejoice at the action which has recently taken place in the Congress of the United States. I have given any open demonstrations of rejoicing, but I must confess to you, fellow-citizens, that I have on several occasions since the passage of that bill, felt an impulse to cry out "Glory! Hallelujah!" [Cheers.] Why should we not rejoice at that action? What is Kansas that she should have caused all this turmoil and confusion throughout the land for the last four years? What is Kansas that she should, during the last four months, have obstructed the general business of the country? What is Kansas that she should endanger the peace and happiness of this great and glorious confederacy of ours? Better, far better, that the foot of the white man should never be set upon the soil of Kansas than that these things should be. [Applause.] Yes, fellow citizens, it would be better that no white man should be allowed to enter Kansas, and that it should be turned over forever to the wild beasts and the savages of the forest—better that the earth should open, and that the whole Territory, from one boundary to the other, should be swallowed up in eternal oblivion—than that the peace and harmony of this country should be endangered, or its best interests imperiled! [Voices—"That's so!"] Then, fellow-citizens, we have cause for rejoicing that something has been done to settle this question. The measure which has just passed ought to secure peace, and restore harmony among the different sections of the confederacy. I do not say that it will do, for there are bad men who, for evil purposes and selfish ends, will oppose the wisest and best measures in order to accomplish their designs; and they may act thus in reference to this, as they have in reference to other just measures that have passed. I am sure that many of them are, but they are mistaken as to what would be the effect of their doctrines when carried out. But they never can be carried out in full, because the God of nature tempts them that they should not be. They never can make a black man anything else than a black man. They never can elevate the black race to an equality with the white race. Never by my vote or by my act, will I aid them in attempting to do it. I never want to see the day come in this country when the black man shall sit at the table with the white man, upon terms of perfect equality. I never want to see the day come in this country when the children of the black man shall go into the school-house and sit side by side with the children of the white man. I never want to see the day come in this country when the black man shall step up to the polls, upon terms of equality with the white man and deposit his vote. I never want to see the day come in this country when the black man shall go into the jury box and sit in judgment upon the rights, the property, or the life of the white man. [Cries of "never! never!"] These things, fellow-citizens, I do not want to see. These things I am ready to resist to the utmost of my ability. I want to see no such doctrines as these carried out in this happy republic of ours. I do not believe that the institution of slavery is the best institution in the world; nor, do I believe it is the worst institution in the world. There are advantages about it, and there are disadvantages about it. It is best that each section and each State of the Union should be allowed to judge as to this matter for itself. If the people of Indiana do not choose to have the institution of slavery, that is our business—let us alone. If our neighbors of Kentucky choose to have the institution of slavery, that is their business—let them alone. Their domestic institutions will not hurt them. Let us all stand together in this great confederacy as equals, each State having the right to regulate its domestic institutions in its own way, and let us apply this doctrine not only to Kansas, but to all the Territories which may come into this Union for all time to come. [Applause.] That is the doctrine of the Democratic party; and when that party is struck down, the best interests of the country will be struck down. [Voices—"that's so!"]

Is the welfare of thirty millions of our own people better or worse than the welfare of the few million negroes in this country, who are better off to-day than any number of the same race in any other part of the world? Stop this agitation, and let me alone. Their domestic institutions will not hurt them. Let us all stand together in this great confederacy as equals, each State having the right to regulate its domestic institutions in its own way, and let us apply this doctrine not only to Kansas, but to all the Territories which may come into this Union for all time to come. [Applause.] That is the doctrine of the Democratic party; and when that party is struck down, the best interests of the country will be struck down. [Voices—"that's so!"]

At the close of the national anthem, three cheers were proposed and given for the President of the United States, and ere they had subsided Mr. Buchanan appeared at the window over the hall door. He appeared to be in excellent health and spirits, and when the cheering with which he was greeted was so flushed that he could be heard he addressed the assembled multitude in a clear and distinct voice, with his usual pleasing style of eloquence.

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

GENTLEMEN: I feel very much honored by the kindness which you have displayed in coming in such respectable numbers to give me a serenade. I have long been acquainted with Washington. I have been intimate with my fellow-citizens of this city for a longer period than many of you have lived, and I have never received anything but kindness, attention and good will from the part of friend and foe, to give it a thorough trial, before a proposition should be brought forward for its repeal. But it seems that Mr. McKee's bump of destructiveness was so largely developed, that he must be killing something, and, as he could not destroy Common Schools, he concluded to try his hand on the Code—but luckily for the country, with the same lack of success in this as in the other experiment.

But, gentlemen, I have still another cause for rejoicing. The passage of this measure will not only tend to restore peace and harmony among the different sections of the confederacy, but it will tend to restore peace and harmony in the bosom of the good-old-fashioned Democratic party—God bless her. [Great applause.]

But, gentlemen, I have still another cause for rejoicing. The passage of this measure will not only tend to restore peace and harmony among the different sections of the confederacy, but it will tend to restore peace and harmony in the bosom of the good-old-fashioned Democratic party—God bless her. [Great applause.]

And, gentlemen, I have also personal reasons for rejoicing in this matter. There were those who knew so little of me as to time to suppose that I had some affinity to the Black republican party, but were more men more mistaken. They deceived themselves, and without my giving them the slightest occasion for it. I was born in the good old Democratic faith; it was the party of my father before me, and never have I, on any occasion, departed from it. [Cheers.] The truth is, fellow-citizens, the Black Republicans deceived themselves. They dug a pit for others to fall into, and, unfortunately for them, fell into it themselves. They may have supposed that they could be safe in it, and now they are.

They ought to have remembered the old story their grandfather told them when they took a fancy to catch a particular bird, that if they could only sprinkle a little salt on its tail they would be sure to get it, and now they have.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going to catch a black bird, and they will be safe in it, and now they are.

They are going

[From the Allegan (Michigan) Record.]
The Scope of Popular Sovereignty.

"Salus populi, est lex supra omnia."

THIRD ARTICLE.

Thus far we have endeavored to ascertain the fundamental principles underlying the systems of both State and Federal Government in this country. We found the confederation of the states, firmly planted upon this basis—the union of States, sovereign, independent, and free within their respective limits to establish and maintain their local, internal, and domestic institutions, and externally equal in federal rights, and mutual obligations. We have also shown that the change from a confederation to the constitution contemplated no radical inroad upon the rights and powers reserved to the State and the people. The Constitution simply embodied a wider range of delegated powers, and a broader sphere for their administrative exercise. It was adopted "in order to form a more perfect Union"—to promote the general welfare and to secure to all "the blessings of liberty." The whole history of the times as well as the instrument itself, authoritatively repel the idea that a new central government was ushered into existence, clothed with any general inherent rights of sovereignty. The exercise of all its functions was liable to modification or recall by the sovereign people.

It is settled by the highest tribunal of the country, itself a co-ordinate branch of the general government, that "the United States (i.e., the government) have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere except in cases where it is delegated, and the Court denies the faculty of the federal government to add to its powers by treaty or compact." The Government then in the acquisition of territory, acquires no sovereignty, and adds nothing to its constitutional capacity for exercising it. In acquiring, holding and disposing of any such territory, it is a simple trustee, subject to all the limitations of the constitution, and to all the reservations of personal, political, and property rights therein to the people.

We have also shown by these contemporaneous expositions of eminent men, that if such territory could be lawfully acquired by treaty, purchase, conquest or otherwise, the Congress possessed no boundless power of legislation in cases where they had as early as 1804 resorted to its dangerous assumption. This is the point where the claim of the general sovereignty which exists in the Government, began to be exercised in territory outside the original limits of the United States or of the separate States. We therefore propose to examine the constitutional grounds for such assumption, the more especially as the system thus initiated finally developed the enormities towards which such precedents travel."

Upon this branch of our subject we are free to confess that a great conflict of opinion has heretofore obtained in our country. But the acknowledged fact, that statesmen and jurists, politicians and judges have been unable to agree in lodging the legislative control of territory, in its sovereign political sense, upon any distinctive clause of the constitution, speaks forcibly against the existence of the power claimed. The concise manner in which the delegations of power are all enunciated in that instrument, and the felicitous language uniformly employed in defining the intended grant, alike demand for clear despotism power claimed, a delegation in apt, specific terms—May not its absence be accounted for, in the settled conviction of the convention, that the people of original States possessed no sovereign legislative power over territories beyond their limits which they could properly delegate? Did they not then recognize in the people of such territory the same rights they had claimed for themselves?

The advocates of the irresponsible power claimed for Congress, have based it, as occasion seemed to require upon various grounds:—upon the "treaty-making power,"—upon the general right of sovereignty in the government,—upon the inherent right of "secession" in the constitution,—and to it carried it to the territories, upon the right to dispose of any such all useful rules and regulations, etc.—and finally upon the power of Congress to admit new States into the Union. In an early case (1 Pet. 511) the Supreme Court, not to be outdone in the breadth of its basic for the power, says "We legislating for them (the territories) Congress exercises the combined power of the general and State governments!"

Of all these different derivations of the power of Congress to govern the territories, but two or three are now insisted upon. If the principal battle has been fought over the "regulation clause." We confess that is looking at the origin of this clause, at the opinion of the statesmen who suggested and moulded the provision, and at the evolution of things then existing, and the pressure of congressional assumptions of power under the confederation, then we are avoided, we have long believed that this clause only applied to the territories as common property—that the right "to dispose of them" was with the right to regulate, could not be extended to the personal, property or political rights of the citizens located there,—that the right, whatever it was, could be exercised as well in a State where any public law was as in a territory;—and consequently could not be extended to the property rights, political rights, or domestic institutions of the people of either State or territory.

But we abstain from further comment of our own upon the distinctive meaning of "the regulation clause," for the purpose of allowing the Supreme Court of the United States to settle this question *verata*. It is true that the decisions of that tribunal exhibit very sensibly, the operation of the general law of progress, not for the enlargement, but the diminution of both the sources and the range of the Congressional power claimed.—That Court in 1 Pet. 542, say, "In the meantime Florida continues to be a Territory of the United States, governed by that clause of the Constitution which empowers Congress to make all needful rules, etc." Perhaps the power of governing a territory belonging to the United States, which has not, by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the facts, that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source from which the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestionable."

In the case of Dred Scott vs. Sandford recently decided by this same Court, the above decision is narrowed down in its amplitude to the right to acquire territory. The Court say, "The power stands firmly on the latter alternative, put by the Court, that is, as the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory." After an elaborate examination of the "regulation clause," the court say of it: "It applied only to the property which the States held in common on that time, and has no reference whatever to any territory or other property which the new sovereignty might afterwards itself acquire." Whether therefore, we take the particular clause in question by itself, or in connection with the other provisions of the constitution, we think it clear, that it applies only to the particular territory of which we have spoken, and cannot by any just rule of interpretation be extended to territory which the new government might afterwards obtain from a foreign nation. Consequently, the power which Congress may have lawfully exercised in this territory, while it remained under a territorial government, and which may have been sanctioned by judicial decision, can furnish no justification and no argument to support a similar exercise of power over territory afterwards acquired by the Federal Government."

Then it seems that this sovereign power of establishing and operating territorial Governments, has been crushed inward by judicial decision, and made finally to rest upon a power in the clause "new States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union," etc. We say to this clause, because in the same decision the Court distinctly rest it there. We are thus judicially relieved from a more extended review of all other shifting sources of this boundless power. "The sovereign Congress" will no longer claim to exercise the combined powers of the General and State Governments upon any basis thus repudiated. "The general right of sovereignty which exists in the Government" will fail

in future of becoming a lodgement for the irresponsible power claimed. "The inherent sovereignty of the Constitution" will no longer be made a boast of burden totting the regalia of power and the cumbersome machinery of unlimited control over persons and property and political rights, in each territory it may chance to visit. The famous "regulation clause," becomes by this decision nearly *futile officio*, and will soon be left to its quiet repose in "the tomb of the Capitols."—And last, though not least, and to us unexpectedly, the treaty making power loses the jewel of "acquiring and then governing" a territory, as by this new view, Congress becomes the *succedaneum* of the Executive in all that branch of treaty traffic, for the Court decide that,

"There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed as its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States. That power is plainly given, and if a new State is admitted, it needs no further legislation by Congress, because the Constitution itself defines the relative rights and powers, and duties of the State, and the citizens of the State, and the General Government." This language is clear, pointed and unmistakable in its import.

It is followed by the further declaration that "The power exercised by Congress to acquire territory and establish a Government there, according to its own unlimited discretion, was viewed with great jealousy by the leading statesmen of the day." The Court then cite approvingly the opinion of Madison, "that the acquisition of the Northwestern Territory, by the confederated States, by the cession of Virginia; and the establishment of a government there, was an exercise of power not warranted by the articles of the confederation, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, and he urges the adoption of the Constitution as a security and safeguard against such an exercise of power."

The opinion of the Court, upon this point, thus expressed and fortified, presents a strong constitutional objection to territorial acquisition as such, under any express or implied power, and if the opinion had ended here, our self imposed task would never, perhaps, have been undertaken.—But inasmuch as the Court proceed in this same connection to concede this very power of acquisition to Congress under the power to expand the territory of the United States by the admission of new States, and the *discretionary power* of government, such territories *ad interium* or until ripe for admission,—and forsooth as the Court bases the concession of such power in Congress, not upon the Constitutional power to admit new States, but upon a construction of this power alleged to have been given "by all the departments of the Government," as to the acquisition of territory unit for admission at the time; and since the Court say *ex necessitate rei* the territory must be governed, and that it was acquired by the exercise of this discretion, and it must be held and governed in like manner until it is fitted to be a State," and the Court finally distinctly announcing that "it was a question for the judicial department of the government and not the judicial," we feel at perfect liberty to examine this novel basis for the sovereign power of Congress over the territories, or in other words, for governing them in its discretion.

The postulate of the Court is, that the power to admit new States, vested in Congress by the Constitution, includes the power of previously acquiring the domain out of which such States were eventually to be formed. Without the slightest attempt to show either logically or analogically, any necessary connection between the two powers, or that the implied power was at all necessary to the exercise of the specifically granted power; we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief against the discreditable usurpation, and are gravely told that, we are gravely told, that such has been the construction "by all the Departments of the Government." This method of examining questions *arguedo* is only equalled by that of Lord Mansfield, as put by Junius: "The decision must be legal because the Court was competent." Seriously, we question whether there ever was an act of a usurpation by a Government, without such constructive power being claimed for its exercise.—We appeal to the Court for relief

THE
BRITISH REVIEWS,
AND
BLACKWOODS MAGAZINE.

Great Inducements to Subscribe.

PREMIUMS AND REDUCTIONS.

L. SCOTT & CO., NEW YORK, continue to publish the following leading British Periodicals:

- 1.—The London Quarterly (Conservative.)
- 2.—The Edinburgh Review (Whig.)
- 3.—The North British Review (Free Church.)
- 4.—The Westminster Review (Liberal.)
- 5.—Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine (Tory.)

These Periodicals are represented by the three most political parties in Great Britain—*the Whigs*, *the Radicals*—but each periodical contains one feature of their character—the organ of the most profound writers on Science, Literature, Morality and Religion, they stand as they have stood, unrivaled in the world of letters, being considered in importance to the schools and the professions, the most valuable reader of every class that furnishes a more correct and satisfactory record of the current literature of the day, throughout the world, than can be possibly obtained from any other source.

EXTRA COPIES.—The receipt of ADVANCE Copies from the British publishers gives additional value to these Reprints, inasmuch as they can now be placed in the hands of the subscribers about as soon as the original editions.

TERMS. (Regular Prices.) Per Annum

For any one of the four Reviews..... \$5 00

For any two of the four Reviews..... 5 00

For any three of the four Reviews..... 5 00

For all four of the Reviews..... 2 00

To Blackwood and one Review..... 5 00

To Blackwood and three Reviews..... 5 00

To Blackwood and the four Reviews..... 10 00

For Blackwood and the four Reviews..... 10 00